The Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in Jeopardy? by Gorman, Robert C.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in
Jeopardy?
Robert C. Gorman
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal
Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law and Race Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gorman, Robert C. (1994) "The Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in Jeopardy?," Akron Law Review: Vol. 27 : Iss.
1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss1/3
THE SECOND RODNEY KING TRIAL: JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY?.
INTRODUCTION
"Shall we allow federal government, our greatest contribution to politi-
cal science, to undermine the rights of the individual, and thus destroy
its very raison d'etre? Shall we fritter away our liberties upon a
metaphysical subtlety, two sovereignties?"'
When a Simi Valley, California, jury acquitted four Los Angeles police officers
of criminal charges in the beating of Rodney King, reaction was swift and violent.2
The verdict led to the nation's deadliest rioting in a quarter of a century3 and created
a sense of outrage in millions of Americans who had viewed the famous videotape
in which police officers struck King fifty-six times. A presidential election was just
six months away, and the federal Administration sprung into action within hours of
the acquittals.5 An intense federal investigation led to indictments of the four police
officers on federal charges,6 followed by a trial in federal district court and conviction
of two of the officers.7
'J.A.C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L REV. 1309, 1331 (1932).
2 See generally Tom Mathews, The Siege of LA., NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 30 (detailed reporting on the Los
Angeles riots).
3 See id.
'According to a Newsweek Magazine / Gallup poll conducted between one and two days after the acquittals, 73
percent of white Americans and 92 percent of African-Americans believed the verdicts were wrong. Id.
' Henry Weinstein & Ronald J. Ostrow, Justice Dept. ResunesItsReview ofKing Beating, LA. TIMES, May 1,1992,
at B 1. A federal investigation into the incident, placed on hold pending the state proceedings, resumed the day after
the jury verdict. Id. "It's important for people to remember that the verdicts on state charges are not the end of the
process," said United States Attorney General William P. Barr. Id.
' Four lndicted by Federal Governmentfor Civil Rights Law Violations In King Case, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 5,1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Officers Laurence M. Powell, Timothy E. Wind and Theodore J.
Briseno were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and § 242 by depriving King of his civil rights by the
intentional use of unreasonable force while making an arrest under color of law. Id. Sergeant Stacey C. Koon was
charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 by willfully permitting officers under his supervision to deprive King of
his right to be kept free from harm while in official custody. Id. For the full text of the grand jury charges, see id.
" Jim Newton, 2 Officers Guilty, 2 Acquitted; Guarded Cabn Follows Verdicts in King Case, LA. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1993, at Al.
1
Gorman: The Second Rodney King Trial
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
Observers praised the federal jury for what appeared to be a Solomon-like
decision.' However, even those who supported the convictions confessed concem
about the potential double jeopardy implications of the second trial.' The Justice
Department defended its prosecution as an application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine, created by the Supreme Court in 192210 and reaffirmed several times in
subsequent decades." Under the doctrine, because the state of California and the
United States are considered separate sovereigns, each can prosecute the same
defendant.'2
The police officers in the King case actually faced different charges in state and
federal courts, even though the charges arose from the same incident. 13 The state
charged each officer with two types of assault. 14 The United States charged each
officer with civil rights violations.'" In relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the
' This commentary by influential African-American columnist William Raspberry indicates what many Americans
were expecting from the federal jury and, at the same time, calls into question the legal integrity of the verdict:
The verdicts were close to perfect: legally sound and civically wise; reasonable, calming and
healing. I don't know if thejurors had all these things in mind when they convicted two Los Angeles
policemen for violating the civil rights of Rodney King and acquitted two others. Surely they must
have given some thought to the fact that last year's acquittal of these same officers of state charges
of police brutality had triggered deadly rioting. How could they not have wondered whether, in
a close case, their duty involved justice as well as peace?
William Raspberry, LA. Verdicts Should Satisfy Most Americans, Aml. J. & CONST., Apr. 21, 1993, at A16
(emphasis added).
9 Raspberry confessed in the same column that he found it "troubling" that he could not "get past the sense that trying
people again for offenses of which they've already been acquitted-even if you give the offense a new name-
amounts to double jeopardy." Id.
Others were morecritical. See, e.g., BruceJ. Terris, Corruption ofJustice in LA., LEGALTIMES, Apr. 26,1993,
at 22. "There is nothing more basic to the American system ofjustice than these two propositions: that the jury makes
the final decision on the guilt of defendants and that the prosecution gets only one opportunity to convince a jury
that a defendant is guilty." Id.
Not surprisingly, Administration officials expressed no qualms about the propriety of a second trial. See Sam
Fuiwood III, Clinton Praises Judgment of Jury, Urges Healing, Harmony Across US., LA. TIMES, Apr. 18,1993,
at A21.
"United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Attorney General Janet
Reno deflected questions about double jeopardy by citing the dual sovereignty doctrine. Paul Craig Roberts, Justice
Takes a Double Jeopardy Hit, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at E3.
12 See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-32.
" See infra notes 14-15.
14 Howard Mintz, Can the Feds Rescue the King Case?, REcORDER, June 9, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Lglnew File.
See supra note 6.
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United States did not attempt to justify its prosecution on a theory that the two sets
of charges constituted different offenses.1 6 Such a theory, if valid, would have
rendered inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits second trials
only for the "same offense.' 7  Whether the state and federal charges did in fact
constitute different offenses justifying a second trial is beyond the scope of this
Comment, which focuses on the dual sovereignty rationale."8
The dual sovereignty doctrine, a "stunningly counterintuitive" concept, 9 has
encountered strong and sustained attack from the legal community, ranging from
dissenting justices2D to respected academics. 2' Nonetheless, the doctrine has with-
stood criticism and, after being called into question by the Warren Court,2 has
gathered strength in recent years.23
This Comment will trace the roots of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and provide a detailed look at the development of the dual sovereignty
doctrine. After this overview, it will analyze the historical, legal and policy
arguments advanced by supporters and opponents of the doctrine. It will examine
proposals for altering or abolishing the doctrine. Finally, in light of the underlying
analysis, it will revisit the Rodney King case and examine whether the defendants'
second trial - or any successive prosecution - is justified.
"'See supra note 11.
"7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
s For articulation of the "same offense" test which is generally used today, see Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299(1932). The Blockburger test is explained concisely in Note, Double Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution
after State Jury Acquittal, 80 MICH. L REV. 1073. 1091-92 (1982).
1Evan Tsen Lee, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: In the Wake of Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 22 NEW ENG. L REV. 31, 31 (1987).
20 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (Black, J., dissenting) (doctrine is "contrary to the spirit of our free
country"). Justice Black was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. Id.
21 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 1, at 1318-19 (doctrine lacks roots in common law); Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False
Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM.
L 1,77 (1992) (doctrine is "a fiction that now utterly fails to resemble reality"); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 383, 425 (1986) (doctrine "has
remained after the reasons that originally prompted it have long since disappeared"). These and other criticisms are
articulated in detail infra notes 98-128.
2 See Murchison, supra note 21, at 417.
2 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (doctrine applies when neighboring states each try a defendant for the same
murder); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (doctrine applies for successive prosecutions by a Native
American tribe and the federal government).
Summer, 1993]
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
Foundation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "no person ... shall
.. be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."" In
providing such protection for the accused, the authors of the amendment continued
a legal tradition that appears to predate the common law.' The principle "has been
declared by many jurists to be a part of the universal law of reason, justice and
conscience."' Ancient Romans believed that even God followed such a rule.' After
brief discussion on the actual wording,' the clause was adopted by the First Congress
of the United States with little debate.2 9
The Double Jeopardy Clause is rooted in the belief that protecting individual
liberty requires some restriction of the government's vast prosecutorial power:
The underlying idea [behind double jeopardy protection] ... is that the
state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty. 0
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Supreme Court has written that the Double Jeopardy Clause consists of three separate constitutional
protections. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969). "It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after an acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And
it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id.
7 Francine Ward, The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1477,1477 (1989).
26JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY at 1 (1969). See also MARTIN L FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY at 3
(1969). "No other procedural doctrine is more fundamental or all-pervasive." Id.
For an excellent overview of the history of double jeopardy protection, see Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double
Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283,283-309 (1963).
27 Ward, supra note 25, at 1477. Canon law prohibited a "double affliction" and taught that God did not make one
suffer twice for the same offense. Id.
28 SIGLER, supra note 26, at 28-32.
2 Id. at 32.
30 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
Commentators provide varying interpretations of the clause's underlying values. Professor Peter Westen of
the University of Michigan believes the clause is a "triptych" of three independent values: the integrity of jury
verdicts, the lawful administration of prescribed sentences and the defendant's interest in finality. Peter Westen,
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The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
For more than a century, the Supreme Court did not adjudicate a case involving
successive prosecutions in which a defendant claimed a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. However, it addressed the possibility of such an occurrence in dicta
in several nineteenth-century cases, including two in 182 0.1 In United States v.
Furlong,3 the Court upheld piracy convictions but added that if the defendants had
been acquitted in another country with jurisdiction, the United States would have
respected the verdict.3 3 In Houston v. Moore,' the Court harshly criticized the
potential repercussions of successive prosecutions: "To subject the people to the
operation of two laws upon the same subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly
in a case inflicting pains and penalties, is... something very much like oppression,
if not worse."
Later in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court disagreed with such dicta. In
Fox v. Ohio,' the defendant argued that the state lacked jurisdiction to convict her
under a state statute banning the uttering of forged coinsY7 She argued that because
the Constitution gave Congress power to coin money and regulate its value, only the
federal government could punish alleged wrongdoers.' Otherwise she could be
subjected to double jeopardy by prosecution under both state and federal law, she
said.' The Court rejected the double jeopardy argument and held that both the state
Another analysis identified five functions of the clause: "1) protecting the defendant's finality interest; 2)
preventing the state from 'wearing down' an innocent defendant; 3) protecting the integrity of jury acquittals; 4)
preventing judges from imposing punishments not authorized by the legislature; and 5) preventing excessive
prosecutorial discretion." Donald E. Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy
Clause, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 799, 805 (1988).
The Supreme Court acknowledges the jury's power to nullify the law by acquitting in the face of overwhelming
evidence against a defendant. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (criminal juries can "acquit
out of compassion or compromise"). The dual sovereignty doctrine fails to protect this nullification power. See
Michael A. Dawson, Note. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE
LJ. 281, 287 (1992).
31 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
32 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 184.
" Id. at 197. "[T here can be no doubt that the plea ofautrefois acquit would be good in any civilized State, though
resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State." Id. The court based this conclusion
on its reasoning that robbery on the seas is an offense within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. Id. Murder,
on the other hand, has no such international jurisdiction, so a plea of autrefois acquit in another country would not
necessarily be respected if the first court lacked jurisdiction. See id.
3 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 1.
Is Id. at 23. After affirming a state military tribunal's conviction of the defendant, the Court added its belief, long
since rejected, that federal legislation in a subject area precludes states from acting in that area. Id. at 22. It based
its belief in the dangers of double jeopardy that would arise from dual application of laws. Id. at 23.
3 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
7Id. at 411.
38 Id. at 424.
" 1d. at 431.
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and federal governments could regulate the activity.1° However, the Court downplayed
the possibility that a person actually would be subjected to dual prosecutions.4 1
Moore v. Illinois42 involved state and federal laws prohibiting harboring of
nnaway slaves.43 The defendant challenged the state law, pointing out that
concurrent laws could subject him to dual prosecutions." The Court found no
problem with that possibility, rejecting the argument that the Double Jeopardy
Clause would be violated.45 Because each citizen "owe[s] allegiance to two
sovereigns .... by one act he [can commit] two offences, for each of whichhe is justly
punishable." By construing a single act as two offenses, the Court avoided any
conflict with the "same offense" language of the Double Jeopardy Clause.47
In a later case, Nielsen v. Oregon,48 the Court reached a different conclusion
when considering whether two states, rather than a state and the federal government,
could prosecute a defendant for the same conduct.49 "[T]he first one acquiring
jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in
both states, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one State cannot
40 Id. at 434.
41 Id. at 435. The Court expressed its view that dual prosecutions would be unlikely:
It is almost certain that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State and federal
systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by the
one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the same,
unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety
demanded extraordinary rigor.
Id.
The decision provoked a strong dissent from Justice McLean: "Mo punish the same act by the two
governments would violate, not only the common principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the nature of
both governments.... [Tiwo punishments for the same act... would be a mockery of justice and a reproach to
civilization." Id. at 439, 440.
4255 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
41 Id. at 17.
" Id. at 19.
45 Id.
"Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
47 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Justice McLean, consistent with his position in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,439
(1847), dissented: "It is contrary to the nature and genius of our government, to punish an individual twice for the
same offence.... It is true, the criminal laws of the Federal and State Governments emanate from different
sovereignties; but they operate upon the same people . Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 21-22.
49 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
'9Id. at 320. The defendant, a Washington resident, was convicted in Oregon of maintaining and operating a purse
net on the Washington side of the Columbia River. Id. at 316. By act of Congress, the river was under thejurisdiction
of both Oregon and Washington. Id. Using a purse net was legal under Washington law but illegal under Oregon
law. See id. at 321. The Court reversed the Oregon conviction, holding that Oregon, by virtue of its concurrent
jurisdiction on the river, could not "override the legislation of Washington, and punish a man for doing within the
territorial limits of Washington an act which that state had specifically authorized him to do[.J" Id.
AKRON LAw Rsvimw [Vol. 27:1
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be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other," wrote the Court, again
in dicta. °
After more than a century of dicta, the Supreme Court finally met the issue head-
on in United States v. Lanza.51 Because previous opinions had expressed both
support and opposition for successive prosecutions, the Court's options were open.
However, the Court decided forcefully in favor of successive prosecutions and in so
doing created the dual sovereignty doctrine.52 "We have here two sovereignties,
deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-
matter within the same territory," wrote Chief Justice Taft for the majority.53 "It
follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is
an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."'
In the generation after Lanza, federal courts rarely revisited the dual sovereignty
issue. ' In 1959, however, the Supreme Court issued a pair of decisions that
reaffirmed the doctrine in strong terms. 56 Bartkus v. Illinois57 involved a defendant
who was convicted of bank robbery in state court after acquittal on federal bank
robbery charges.58 The Court focused on Lanza and the nineteenth-century dicta
50 Id. at 320.
51260 U.S. 377 (1922). The defendant had been convicted in state court of manufacturing liquor in violation of a
prohibition statute. Id. at 379. When charged on the federal level with essentially the same offense, he argued that




The Court appeared to ignore the legislative history of the Eighteenth Amendment in making this decision. See
Murchison, supra note 21, at 389-90. The Eighteenth Amendment gave federal and state governments concurrent
enforcement power. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933). House Judiciary Committee Chairman Webb,
author of the "concurrent power" language, said he believed that the language meant "the Federal Government
cannot do it if the State government does it, and vice versa.... mhe first getting jurisdiction would enforce it." 56
CONG. REC. 424 (1917). Even the leaders of the dry lobbies agreed that the amendment would not allow successive
prosecutions. Grant, supra note 1, at 1311. The Court
took its strong constitutional stand despite the fact that the issue of successive prosecutions had neither been briefed
nor argued by the parties. Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (1967) [hereinafterDouble Prosecution].
" With the exception of Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926), a prohibition case in which a state's power to
prosecute following a federal trial was recognized, the Supreme Court did not address dual sovereignty again
throughout the prohibition era. Murchison, supra note 21, at 395.
soSee infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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cases in favor of the dual sovereignty doctrine. s9 Justice Frankfurter wrote that a
"long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication" compelled the
conclusion that the second trial was constitutional.' Abbate v. United States"
involved a defendant who had pleaded guilty to state charges of conspiracy to destroy
communications equipment.62 The federal government then convicted the defendant
of conspiracy to destroy systems involved in interstate commerce.63 The Court again
cited the dicta in the century-old Moore case as the underlying support for the dual
sovereignty doctrine.Y The doctrine prevailed over the strong dissent of Justice
Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, who believed that
successive prosecutions are "contrary to the spirit of our free country.
' 65
-" Id. at 128-32.
60 Id. at 136. For a critique of Frankfurter's reasoning, see Braun, supra note 21, at 14. "The course of adjudication
was not 'long.' 'unbroken,' or 'unquestioned'; frankly, it was not that 'impressive."' Id.
Justice Frankfurter rejected arguments that common law precedents compelled the second court to respect the
judgment of the first. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 128 n.9. He deemed comparisons with the common law irrelevantbecause
of "confused and inadequate" reporting on key precedent and the "power of discretion vested in English judges not
relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism." Id. For a rebuke of Frankfurter's dismissal of centuries of
common law on successive prosecutions, see Braun, supra note 21, at 22 n.122.
"1359 U.S. 187 (1959).
2 Id. at 188.
3 Id. at 188-89.
" Id. at 191-92.
61 Bartkus v. Illinois,359 U.S. 121,150 (1959). Justice Brennan also dissented in Bartkus but did not reject the dual
sovereignty doctrine. See id. at 164-70. His dissent was based in his belief that the federal government's extensive
role in the state trial made the trial a de facto second federal prosecution. Id. at 165-66.
Within a week of the Bartkus and Abbate decisions, the Justice Department announced an internal policy,
followed to this day, which restricts the conditions under which the federal government will prosecute following a
state trial. Ophelia S. Camina, Selective Preemption: A Preferential Solution to the Barikus-Abbate Rule in
Successive Federal-State Prosecutions, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 340,347(1981). The policy has been incorporated
into the United States Attorneys' Manual and reads today:
The Department of Justice's Policy on dual prosecution and successive federal prosecution precludes
the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution following a state prosecution or a prior federal
prosecution based on substantially the same act, acts or transaction unless there is compelling federal
interest supporting the dual or successive federal prosecution. The policy is intended to regulate
prosecutorial discretion in order to promote efficient utilization of the Department's resources and to
protectpersons charged with criminal conduct from the unfairness associated with multiple prosecutions
and multiple punishments for substantially the same act or acts....
mhe policy requires that authorization be obtained from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General
prior to initiating or continuing the federal prosecution ..
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNrrED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.142 (1988).
The policy is known as the Petite Policy because its existence was first acknowledged by the Supreme Court
in Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). Its purpose is to protect the individual from needless multiple
prosecutions. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22,31 (1977). However, it gives no substantive rights to defendants,
and prosecutions conducted in violation of the policy are not subject to dismissal as a result. United States v.
Mitchell, 778 F,2d 1271,1277 (7thCir. 1985); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation,EffectonFederalCriminalProsecution
or Conviction of Prosecutor's Noncompliance with Petite Policy Requiring Prior Authorization of Attorney Generalfor
FederalTrialWhereAccusedHasBeenPreviouslyProsecutedforSameActsinStateCowt,51 A.LRL FED. 852, 854 (1981).
[Vol. 27:1AKRONq LAw REVIEW
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The Warren Court expanded criminal rights significantly in areas involving the
relationship between state and federal governments. 66 This expansion prompted
speculation that successive prosecutions would be abolished or modified.67 How-
ever, the Court failed to reject the dual sovereignty doctrine.61 Less sympathetic to
criminal defendants, the Burger Court rejuvenated the doctrine and extended it to
two new contexts. 69 United States v. Wheeler7° held that successive prosecutions by
a Native American tribe and the federal government did not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause .7 Heath v. Alabaman  applied the doctrine to successive trials by
different states, holding that one state could prosecute a defendant for murder- and
sentence him to death - even after he had pleaded guilty to the same murder in
another state and was serving a life sentence.73
" In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court, recognizing the blurred lines between state and federal
criminal investigation, abolished the "silver platter doctrine," which had allowed evidence illegally seized by state
officials to be used in federal prosecutions. Id. at 208. The doctrine "engender[s] practical difficulties in an era
of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 210. "To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right
has been invaded by a federal agent orby a state officer." Id. at 215.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court held that a witness
granted immunity from prosecution under state law could not be compelled to give testimony that might incriminate
him in a federal investigation. Id. at 79. The Court noted that the nation was in an "age of 'cooperative federalism,'
where the Federal and State Governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal activity." Id.
at 55-56.
These cases, allowing a defendant in one jurisdiction to assert rights based on actions of officials in another
jurisdiction, "seriously erode the doctrinal basis of Bartkus and Abbate." Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at
1546.
'Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1565. Justice Harlan in a later case described theMurphy decision as having
"abolished the two sovereignties' rule." Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234,250 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
" The Warren Court's motivation for maintaining the rule might have been concern that a bar on successive
prosecutions could conflict with the Court's emphasis on civil rights protection for African-Americans. Murchison,
supra note 21, at 433-34.
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
71 Id. at 329-30. The Court held that Native American tribes have "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty." Id.
at 322. Therefore, the tribe in its prosecution was not acting as an arm of the federal govemmenL Id. at 328.
72474 U.S. 82 (1985).
73Id. at 88. The defendant, an Alabama resident, hired two men to kidnap and murder his wife. Id. at 83. The body
was found in Georgia. Id. at 84. After he confessed and pleaded guilty in Georgia, he was prosecuted in Alabama.
Id. at 84-85.
The Court distinguished the case from conflicting dicta in Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909): "We find
that Nielsen is limited to its unusual facts and has continuing relevance, if at all, only to questions of jurisdiction
between two entities deriving their concurrent jurisdiction from a single source of authority." Heath, 474 U.S. at
91.
For a criticism of the Court's decision to extend the dual sovereignty doctrine to successive prosecutions by
different states, see Martin D. Caprow. Comment, Heath v. Alabama: Double Jeopardy in Jeopardy: Dual
Sovereignty or Due Process, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 147 (1986). "Abhorrent is Heath's crime of murder, yet decencies
of fairness and of a civilized state find a tacit repeal of double jeopardy standards even more so." Id. at 161.
Summer, 1993]
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The Court has recognized situations in which the dual sovereignty doctrine does
not apply. Both a state and a subdivision of the state cannot prosecute an accused for
the same offense.74 There is no dual sovereignty in such circumstances because both
jurisdictions derive their power from the same sovereign - the state.' The Court
also has implicitly recognized an exception to the doctrine when the second
prosecution is merely a tool for the sovereignty in the first trial to make another effort
to convict the defendant. 76 Many federal courts acknowledge this exception in
theory.' Apparently no defendant, however, has won reversal of a conviction on
these grounds. 8
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitu-
tion applies fully to state governments as well as the federal government, rendering
it irrelevant from a federal constitutional standpoint whether the state or federal
government is conducting the second prosecution. 9 Nearly half the states statutorily
prohibit or restrict state prosecution after federal action, rendering it much more
likely that the second prosecution will be conducted by the federal government °
7" Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,394-95 (1970).
"Seeid.at392 This principle would preclude the federal government and he District of Columbia from conducting
successive prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d 354,361 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dicta).
6 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959). Such a situation presumably would arise if, for example,
the federal government lost a trial and provided the impetus, including investigatory resources and personnel, for
a second trial in state court. See Braun, supra note 21, at 60-64. The majority in Bartkus did not believe the federal
government overreached into the state's case. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24. However, Justice Brennan dissented
because he felt the state prosecution was a de facto second federal trial. Bartkas, 359 U.S. at 165-66 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Braun, supra note 21, at 60.
The existence of the "sham" exception is called into question by United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th
Cir. 1987). After charges were dismissed in state court, the state's deputy attorney general contacted federal
prosecutors, who had no knowledge of the case. See id. at 181. The U.S. Attorney agreed to prosecute the case only
on the condition that the state attorney, continuing to be paid by the state, would be the lead attorney for the federal
case. Id. at 181-82. The district court, invoking the "sham" exception, dismissed the subsequent conviction. Id.
at 182. However, the appeals court, although admitting the "troubling" nature of state involvement, reinstated the
conviction, holding that the circumstances did not fit into the "narrow exception to the 'dual sovereignty doctrine."'
Id. at 183.
One commentator said Bernhardt showed "the impotence of the existing exception." Braun, supra note 21,
at 63. "[Hlad the exception meant anything at all, it would have protected the defendants from a second trial." Id.
'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Prior to this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not apply if the
state government was the sovereignty conducting the second prosecution. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124.
w See ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1987);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-303 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 209 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-315
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (West 1986); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(3) (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.050 (Baldwin 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045
(West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 40.20(2) (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 130 (West
1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294
(Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1982).
AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 27:1
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss1/3
Tm SEmoND RoD. KiNo ThAIL: Jusinc IN JEOPARDY?
ANALYSIS OF THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
Support for the Doctrine
Justice Grier in 1852 articulated the rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine
in oft-quoted language:"1
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.
He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable
to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may
be an offence or transgression to the laws of both .... That either or both
may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it
cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the
same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences,
for each of which he is justly punishable. s2
Under this theory, an act which violates the laws of both governments is not a
single offense, but two. 3 By its terms, the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable only
when a person faces two prosecutions for the same offense.8 Therefore, it is not
implicated when two offenses are involved. s5
Proponents support the dual sovereignty doctrine with public policy arguments
related to the authority of the state and federal governments. Justice Frankfurter said
a rule barring state prosecutions after a federal trial would be a "shocking and
untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain
Statutes vary in scope and effect. Braun, supra note 21, at 5 n.15. For example, Minnesota prohibits a second
prosecution only for crimes having "identical elements of law and fact." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West 1987).
Wisconsin bars a subsequent prosecution "unless each [statutory] provision requires proof of a fact for conviction
which the other does not require." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1982). California, on the other hand, prohibits
a subsequent trial whenever it would involve the same "act or omission" as the first trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 656
(West 1988).
Some states without legislative measures prohibiting successive prosecutions are apt to limit such prosecutions
as a matter of policy, given the general ambivalence toward prosequting a defendant twice. Caprow, supra note 73,
at 156.
81Moorev. Illinois,55 U.S. (14 How.) 13,19-20(1852) (dicta). This passageis quoted at length in Heath v. Alabama,
474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 192 (1959); and Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-32.
2 Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 19-20.
u See id.
4U.S. CONST. amend. v.
"Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 20.
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peace and order within their confines." Similarly, Justice Brennan wrote inAbbate
v. United States, a rule barring federal prosecutions after a state trial would
"necessarily... hinder" federal law enforcement efforts." The dual sovereignty
doctrine, therefore, protects the interests of each distinct sovereign - interests that
are not always protected by the other sovereign .8 8
Supporters of the doctrine also argue that a rule barring successive prosecutions
could lead to an unseemly "race to the courthouse." 9 Fearing that their counterparts
in the other sovereignty could preclude them from taking action, prosecutors would
seek indictments hastily.9 Ill-supported indictments could stigmatize innocent
defendants who would benefit from a full investigation before charges are levied.91
Such haste also could lead to procedural defects that might exonerate guilty
defendants on technicalities. 92
"Bartkusv. Illinois,359 U.S. 121,137(1959). JusticeFrankfurtercitedScrewsv. UnitedStates,325 U.S. 91 (1945),
in which defendants, southern law enforcement officers, arrested a young black man and beat him to death with a
solid-barblackjack. Id. at 92. They were convicted in federal court of depriving the victim of his constitutional rights
without due process of law. Id. at 94. However, the maximum sentence under the federal statutes at the time was
two years. Id. at 139 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter wrote in Bartkus that the state's interest was not
vindicated by a maximum two-year federal sentence when a state trial could result in the death penalty. See Bartkus,
359 U.S. at 137.
"Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 186, 195 (1959). Justice Brennan pointed out that in Abbate, the defendants
pleaded guilty to state charges and were sentenced to three months in prison. Id. at 188. Because the federal statute
carried a potential five-year sentence, the comparatively lenient state sentence did not vindicate the federal
government's interest. See id. at 195.
"See Note, supra note 18, at 1077. The federal government has a special concern that federal civil rights interests
will not be protected by the states. I& at 1077 n.20.
An example of the federal government vindicating its civil rights interest is United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d
1094 (5th Cir. 1984). cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). The defendant had been acquitted in state court of murdering
an African-American man in a city park. Id. at 1096. He then was charged under a federal statute prohibiting
interference with a person's use of a state facility because of his race. Id. He was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison. Id.
See also UnitedStates v. Patterson,809 F.2d244 (5thCir. 1987), wherefacts aresimilartothe Kingdefendants'
case. A police officer directing traffic at the scene of an accident became involved in a dispute with a driver and shot
him. Id. at 245. A state court acquitted the officer of attempted murder after the defendant claimed the driver had
attempted to ran him down. Id A federal jury convicted the officerof willfully depriving the victim of liberty without
due process of law. Id. at 246. The appeals court refused to address the defendant's double jeopardy argument
"because this court is without authority to disregard applicable Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 247 (citing Abbate
and Lanza).
The importance of the dual sovereignty doctrine to state interests is articulated in Double Prosecution, supra
note 54, at 1557 (without doctrine, state would lose opportunity to vindicate its interest whenever federal authorities
insist on prosecuting the accused).
"See Lee, supra note 19, at 52-53.
9'See id; see also Braun, supra note 21, at 57.
9 Braun, supra, note 21, at 57. "In some instances, an individual would be unfairly and undeservedly implicated;
in others, a guilty defendant might go free becauseof procedural defects caused by the prosecutor's haste in bringing
the charges." Id.
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Allowing successive prosecutions avoids possible injustices which could result
from imperfect coordination between state and federal prosecutors. 93 There likely
would be occasions when a jurisdiction with a perceived lesser interest will initiate
a prosecution, thereby precluding prosecution by the sovereignty with the stronger
interest.94
In summary, proponents of the dual sovereignty doctrine base their theory on a
formalistic interpretation of sovereignty"4 which includes the right of each sovereign
to vindicate its interests without interference.6 Proponents support their theory by
forecasting what they consider unacceptable results if the doctrine yielded to the
Double Jeopardy Clause.97
Opposition to the Doctrine
Critics argue that the dual sovereignty doctrine values a formalistic notion of
federalism at the expense of individual rights." The doctrine is attacked as
theoretically flawed 99 and constitutionally deficient. 1°°
Critics dispute the doctrine's foundational premise that the state and federal
government are separate sovereigns.'10 They argue that the Framers of the Consti-
tution conceived of sovereignty as residing in members of the governed society,
rather than residing in the government.' 2 Moreover, the concept that a single nation
"See Lee, supra note 19, at 53; Braun, supra note 21, at 57.
" Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
"
5 Braun, supra note 21, at 9.
"See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137.
9See supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
"See Braun, supra note 21, at 9.
"See Braun, supra note 21, at 39 (doctrine is "a theoretical failure"); Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1542
(doctrine "seems conceptually imprecise").
'w Dawson, supra note 30, at 299.
0 1 
"Every citizen.., may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns." Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19
(1852).
'"See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 280-81 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961); see alsoDouble
Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1542. "[A] n act which transgresses the 'peace and dignity of the sovereign' may more
satisfactorily be regarded as an act against the 'peace and dignity' of one society, which may be vindicated by either
its local or national government." Id. (emphasis added).
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can contain more than one sovereign appears to be inconsistent with the common law
understanding of the word "sovereignty":
The conventional British position understood "sovereignty" as that
indivisible, final, and unlimited power that necessarily had to exist
somewhere in every political society. A single nation could not operate
with two sovereigns any more than a single person could operate with
two heads; some single supreme political will had to prevail .... t03
It appears the Framers did not abandon a unitary concept when they embraced
federalism; Hamilton emphasized that "the [s]tate governments and the national
governments... are... kindred systems,... parts of ONE WHOLE.""t
Furthermore, assuming that the concept of two sovereigns was legitimate at the
time of Moore v. Illinois to5 and United States v. Lanza, 106 critics argue that the theory
does not comport with today's brand of federalism, which involves direct and
substantial cooperation between federal and state governments, particularly in law
enforcement. 101 Justice Goldberg acknowledged as much when writing for the
majority in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission ofNew York Harbor. " The case held
that a witness granted immunity from state prosecution may not be compelled to give
testimony which might incriminate him under federal law.1 9 Justice Goldberg
recognized the reality of "'cooperative federalism,' where the Federal and State
Governments wage a united front against many types of criminal activity."'110
'03Ak R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1430 (1987).
01 TE FEDERALIST NO. 82 at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). In contrast to the
Framers, the Supreme Court seems to believe "that polities, not people, possess sovereign power in this country."
Braun, supra note 21, at 9.
Madison believed that the two distinct govenments would act as a check on each other. "[A] double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will
be controlled by itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
The two governments working together in criminal prosecutions seem to remove any such check. See Braun, supra
note 21, at 72.
10 5 5 U.S. (14 How.) at 13.
-0260 U.S. 377 (1922).
107 See Braun, supra note 21, at 7. "Reality (in the time of Lanza) seemed to support the dual sovereignty doctrine's
description of two independent sovereigns protecting their respective orders. However, that reality has changed."
Id. The federal government is far more involved in criminal law than it was at the time of Lanza. See id. at 5.
1- 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
119 Id. at 79-80.
.. Id. at 55-56. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, also wrote approvingly of the "increasing interaction
between the State and Federal Governments." Id. at 91 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Harlan later
wrote of Murphy as having "abolished the two sovereignties' rule." Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 250 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) The District of Columbia Circuit of the Court of Appeals
seemed to agree, saying "[tihere is a serious question whether the doctrinal line from Fox to Bartkus has not been
eroded by Murphy." United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Justice Stewart also acknowledged the blurred lines between state and federal
governments when writing for the Court in Elkins v. United States. "' In Elkins, the
Court abolished the "silver platter doctrine" which had allowed evidence seized
illegally by state officials to be used in federal trials.112 Justice Stewart rejected the
silver platter doctrine because it "engender[s] practical difficulties... [in light of]
the entirely commendable practice of state and federal agents to cooperate with each
other in the investigation and detection of criminal activity. ' 3
Critics of the doctrine also chide Justice Frankfurter for casting aside centuries
of common law on successive prosecutions." 4 The common law has held that a
defendant's proof of acquittal or conviction in another court bars a subsequent
prosecution." 5 "One searches the British Empire in vain for support for the 'dual
sovereignty' theory of successive prosecutions," wrote Professor J.A.C. Grant of the
University of California at Los Angeles at theconclusion of anexhaustive study." 6
" 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
2 Id at 223.
3 Id. at 211.
The Court established the silver platter doctrine in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), decided in the
same era as Lanza. The Warren Court in 1960 rejected that doctrine because of the evolving relationship between
state and federal law enforcement officials. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208. However, just one year before, the Court
had refused to reconsider the dual sovereignty doctrine, established in the same era as the silver platter doctrine.
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
"Modem decisions have consistently rejected the nineteenth century view that federalism created distinct and
mutually exclusive spheres of federal and state authority for a more dynamic view that recognizes the need for
changing limits and acknowledges the possibility of overlapping powers." Murchison, supra note 21, at 427.
In light of such modem decisions, how has the dual sovereignty doctrine survived? Professor Kenneth
Murchison of Louisiana State University has two explanations. First, Abbate and Bartkus arose near the beginning
of the Warren Court's expansion of rights of the accused. Id at 433. The Court had not yet held that many of the
criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights-including the Double Jeopardy Clause-were applicable to
the states. Id. Second, abolishing the dual sovereignty doctrine-thereby allowing state prosecutions to preclude
federal action-might have conflicted with the Court's protection of the civil rights of black Americans. Id. at 433 -
34. When the Warren Court yielded to the Burger Court, extending additional protections to criminal defendants was
no longer a priority. Id. at 434.
4 See supra note 60.
"
5 See J.A.C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law andBritish Empire Comparisons,
4 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1956). The leading common law example was Rex v. Hutchinson, 3 Keb. 785, 84 Eng.
Rep. 1011 (IB. 1678), a sketchily reported case which was discussed in greater detail in many subsequent cases.
Grant, supra, at 9. Hutchinson allegedly committed a murder in Portugal but was acquitted in a trial there. Id.
However, England attempted to convict him for the same act. Id. The Judges of the King's Bench all agreed that his
acquittal in Portugal barred a subsequent trial in England. Id.
See also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (dicta) ("[There can be no doubt that
the plea of autrefois acquit would be good in any civilized state"); FRIEDLAND, supra note 26, at 364 (An English
court will recognize an acquittal by a foreign court having territorial jurisdiction over the offense).
'6 Grant, supra note 115, at 34. "[The vast majority of the courts throughout the British Empire have taken it for
granted that common law rights do not stop with sovereign boundaries." Id. at 35.
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Given our nation's common law roots, it is anomalous that "the nation and the states
are now more foreign to each other than England is to France.""17
The dual sovereignty doctrine also is criticized for undermining the sovereignty
of the people, who, acting through a jury, have the right to nullify the law."" This
nullification power, it is argued, renders the dual sovereignty doctrine unconstitu-
tional because the doctrine "denigrates the principle of popular sovereignty under-
lying the Double Jeopardy Clause. An exercise of popular sovereignty is final and
unappealable. ... Having invited the popular will to check its authority, government
may not simply disregard it and try again." " 9
The dual sovereignty doctrine receives strong criticism for its failure to consider
the liberty interests of the accused.12 The Supreme Court, in adhering to its
formalistic theory that federalism creates two distinct sovereigns, does not weigh the
burden on the individual facing successive prosecutions.12' Justice Black, joined by
11 Grant, supra note 1, at 1312. Justice Black, citing Grant in his dissent in Abbate, wrote, "I cannot conceive that
our States are more distinct from the Federal Government than are foreign nations from each other." Abbate, 359
U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
Added anothercritic, "It is a strange breed of federalism which demands such results." FRIEDLAND, supra note
26, at 426. "Ironically, the majority decision in Bartkus cites the statement of Brandeis J. that the separation of powers
was adopted in the constitution 'not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.'
Unfortunately, the result of Bartkus is to encourage this result." Id.
"I Dawson, supra note 30, at 282. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this right. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307,317 n. 10 (1979) ("thefactfinderin a criminalcase has traditionally been permitted to enter an unassailable
but unreasonable verdict of 'not guilty"); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (criminal juries can
"acquit out of compassion or compromise").
19 Dawson, supra note 30, at 299. See also supra note 118; Susan Warren, 2ndKing Trial Raises Double Jeopardy
Flag, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1992, at 23. "It just seems in political cases that the attitude is, 'We will try you until we
get you.' And I don't know that that's what justice is all about." Id. (quoting a Texas judge).
Two dozen states have enacted legislation limiting successive prosecutions by the state. See supra note 80.
Some critics argue that federal pursuit of a second trial in a state where the legislature has expressed the people's
will against successive prosecutions is an affront to state sovereignty. See Murchison, supra note 21, at 428. "The
practical effect of such federal prosecutions is to override the state's determination that multiple prosecutions are
not necessary to vindicate the policies of its criminal law." Id. See also Dawson, supra note 30, at 282. "The dual
sovereignty doctrine allow[s] government to ignore [the first] verdict ... and undermine the sovereignty of the
people." Id.
O'See Mark E. Lewis, Recent Decision, Heath v. Alabama: The Conflict Between Dual Sovereignty and Double
Jeopardy, 38 ALA. L REV. 153 (1986). "Rather than seeing federalism as a means to protect individual interests
and to provide insurance against an arbitrary government, the Court viewed federalism as an end in itself to be
achieved at the expense of individual rights." Id. at 159. See also Conflicts in Court, 191 ECONOMIST 233 (1959).
"Justice Frankfurter's opinion... seemed sometimes to view federalism as an end in itself, not as a means to a better
life for individuals." Id., quoted in SIGLER, supra note 26, at 59.
121 See supra note 120.
The Court in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), extending the dual sovereignty doctrine to successive
prosecutions by neighboring states, explicitly rejected a balancing test which would consider the liberty interest of
the accused. "[The] balancing of interests approach ... cannot be reconciled with the dual sovereignty principle,"
wrote Justice O'Conner for the Court. Id. at 92. "If the States are separate sovereigns, as they must be under the
definition of sovereignty which the Court consistently has employed, the circumstances of the case are irrelevant
... [The dual sovereignty doctrine is not simply a fiction that can be disregarded in difficult cases." Id. The case
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Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, wrote in his Bartkus dissent, "Our Federal
Union was conceived and created 'to establish [j]ustice' and to 'secure the [b]lessings
of [l]iberty,' not to destroy any of the bulwarks on which both freedom and justice
depend. We should, therefore, be suspicious of any supposed 'requirements' of
'federalism' which result in obliterating ancient safeguards."' Prosecuting twice
for the same conduct is "contrary to the spirit of our free country," wrote Justice
Black. 123
Justice Black and others have criticized the "metaphysical subtlety"'14 of dual
sovereignty that casts aside a universal maxim of the common law-protection
against repeat prosecutions: 12
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same
act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the
Federal Government and the other by a State. Looked at from the
standpoint of the individual who is being prosecuted, this notion is too
subtle for me to grasp. If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts
no less for two '[s]overeigns' to inflict it than for one. 126
The doctrine seems out of step with the customary broad interpretations of individual
rights in this country. 27 "It has been repeatedly decided that [the Bill of Rights]
shows the Court's commitment to the doctrine and its refusal to reconsider the possibly erroneous foundation-a
definition of "sovereign" that is inconsistent with common law traditions. See supra tex acconpanying notes 101-04.
At least one state has disagreed with the Supreme Court and considered a balancing test appropriate. See
Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A. 2d 638 (Pa. 1971):
When one examines the 'dual sovereignty doctrine' as it applies to thedouble jeopardy clause, we
are really involved in a balancing process, whereby we place the interests of the two sovereigns on
one side of the judicial scale, and on the other side weplace theinterest d the individual to be free from
twice being prosecaed and punished for the same offense. The basic problem with Bariks is that the
majority... failed to really examine the interest of the individual.
Id. at 640-41 (emphasis added).
t' Barikus v. Ulinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
1 I. at 150.
1 Grant, supra note 1, at 1331 (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 64 n.125 (1820) (Story, J.,
dissenting)).
' Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
2 I
See Grant, supra note 1, at 1329.
The Warren Court applied double jeopardy protection broadly in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), in
which collateral estoppel was held to be a component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 445. The case arose out
of the armed robbery of six poker players. Id. at 437. The defendant was charged with robbing one of the players.
and was acquitted. Id. at 439. He then was charged with robbing another of the players, and he was convicted and
sentenced to35 years injail. d. at 440. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause "surely
protects a man who has been acquitted form having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." Id. at 446.
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should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or
'gradual depreciation' of the rights," wrote the Court in 1921-just a year before
Lanza.lu8
Proposed Alternatives to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
Critics of the dual sovereignty doctrine generally acknowledge that a prophylac-
tic rule eliminating all successive prosecutions would be unwise. 29 A wide range of
proposed alternatives to the dual sovereignty doctrine address the practical concerns
of Justice Frankfurter and others.
The Model Penal Code, published by the American Law Institute in 1962, takes
the following approach:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction
of [the] State and of the United States or another State, a prosecution in
any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this
State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in acquittal or in a conviction.., and
the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (a)
[each prosecution] requires proof of a fact not required by the other and
the law defining each [offense] is intended to prevent a substantially
different harm... or
(2) The [first prosecution resulted in an acquittal]. . . which...
necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must
be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is
subsequently prosecuted.130
W Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S 298, 303-04 (1921).
In response to the argument that abolishing the doctrine would hinder federal interests, critics point out that the
federal government can protect its interests by taking exclusive jurisdiction over a particular crime or setting
minimum penalties which would be applicable in both state and federal courts. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 202 n.2 (1959) (Black, I., dissenting). However, such pre-emption power is not available to states, rendering
abolition of the doctrine potentially more harmful to state interests than to federal interests. See Double Prosecution,
supra note 54, at 1558.
t2 See Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1565; Dominic T. Holzhaus, Note, Double Jeopardy and Incremental
Culpability: A UnitaryAlternative to theDual Sovereignty Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L REV. 1697,1711(1986); Braun,
supra note 21, at 73.
'-MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
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Under this test, prosecution by federal and state governments on identical charges
would be precluded. 31 Even if the charges were different, a second trial would be
barred if federal and state interests were essentially the same or if conviction in the
second trial would require a factual determination at odds with the first trial. 32
State legislatures have taken it upon themselves to limit state prosecutions
following a federal trial.13 The legislation varies widely in scope and effect.'3' In
two states without such legislation, courts have adopted a rule that a second
prosecution is allowed only if the state's interest is "substantially different" from the
interest of the federal government in the first prosecution.3
Scholars have offered several tests of varying complexity for when successive
prosecutions should be barred. One proposal, recognizing the frequent collaboration
between levels of government, would prohibit a second prosecution when "state and
federal officials participating in the investigation or prosecution of criminal conduct
have acted more like representatives of one government than of two.' 1 36 Another
proposal suggests a focus on incremental culpability: a second prosecution would
be permitted when it is for a degree of wrongfulness or culpability not vindicated in
the first prosecution. 13 Under this theory, the successive prosecution in Abbate v.
United States 1 would be permitted, because the federal government was pursuing
a degree of wrongfulness -disruption of federal communications - over and above
the state's charge of destruction of property. 39 On the other hand, the second trial
13 See id
m See Camina, supra note 65, at 355. A 1971 proposed federal criminal code, drafted by a commission established
by Congress, included a section on successive prosecutions nearly identical to the Model Penal Code approach. See
id. at 356-60.
" See supra note 80 for a listing of states which have adopted legislation limiting successive prosecutions.
34 See supra note 80.
" See Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1971); see also People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870
(Mich. 1976). In Cooper, Michigan's Supreme Court refined the"substantially different" test by articulating a series
of guidelines. Id. at 870-71. State interests are substantially different from federal interests when the maximum
penalties of the statutes involved vary greatly, when the federal court cannot adequately vindicate the state's interest
in obtaining a conviction, and when the difference in the statutes is substantive rather than jurisdictional. See id.
For elaboration on Michigan's treatment of successive federal-state prosecutions, see Laura A. Marshall, Note,
Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy-Successive Federal-State Prosecutions are Barred by the Michigan
Double Jeopardy Clause, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L99 (1981).
136Braun, supra note2l, at73. "Whenlaw enforcement efforts attest to the emergence of the'cooperative conception
of Federalism' ... the Constitution should not be read to cling to the unconvincing illusion that 'we live in the
jurisdiction of two sovereignties."' Id.
The rule, while simple, is vague, but Braun is undaunted by such criticism: "I am not too troubled by the
vagueness of this statement. Court have often been satisfied to formulate new rules of law in general terms, leaving
the often difficult task of line-drawing for future decisions." Id. at 74.
"1 See Holzhaus, supra note 129, at 1706.
3 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
"3 Holzhaus, supra note 129, at 1707.
Summer, 1993]
19
Gorman: The Second Rodney King Trial
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
in Bartkus v. Illinois 140 would not have been allowed because the state was
prosecuting for the same crime-bank robbery-for which the federal government
had prosecuted and lost. 1
Another proposal would allow the federal government to pre-empt state pros-
ecutions if a federal trial is necessary to protect national interests. 42 This suggestion
would keep primary control of criminal conduct in the hands of states while allowing
the federal government to vindicate its interests on a case-by-case basis. 4 3 Other
proposals include codifying the Justice Department's Petite Policy'" to give sub-
stantive rights to the accused if the government fails to follow the policy' 45 and
precluding successive federal trials in states which bar second prosecutions
by the state.'"
A minority of critics advocate a nearly complete bar of successive prosecutions,
with a second trial permitted only in the event of collusive or fraudulent first trials.
Justice Black took this relatively hard line, 47 as did Professor J.A.C. Grant of the
University of California at Los Angeles.'" It may be noteworthy that both of these
critics of the doctrine wrote prior to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, in which
140359 U.S. 121 (1959).
'
41 Holzhaus, supra note 129, at 1707. Nor would the second trial have been allowed in Lanza, in which-he state was
prosecuting for the same wrong-violating prohibition-for which the federal government had prosecuted. Id. at
1708. Under this theory, a federal civil rights charge "generally involves an additional increment in culpability and
thus a separate offense" justifying a successive prosecution. Id. at 1711.
"2 See, e.g., Camina, supra note 65, at 362; Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1554-55.
" See sources cited supra note 142. The practicality of such a rule is questionable; it is unlikely that the federal
government can monitor all state dockets to ensure its involvement in a timely manner.
A variation on this rule has been proposed by Harland Braun, the Los Angeles attorney who represented officer
Theodore Briseno in the federal King defendants' trial. Darlene Ricker, Double Exposure: Did the Second Rodney
King Trial Violate Double Jeopardy? A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 66,67. He proposes that an accused who may face
federal prosecution could notify federal authorities of the state action. Id. at 67. Federal prosecutors would have up
to 60 days to decide whether to take over the case. Id. Such a proposal would eliminate "tag team" prosecutions,
Braun said. Id. at 68.
'"See supra note 65.
' See Murchison, supra note 21, at 431. "Mhe Court should recognize the [Petite] rule as a substantive policy
designed to implement an important constitutional value." Id.
I" ld at 435.
"
7See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). "I would hold that a federal trial following
either state acquittal or conviction is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
14BSee Grant, supra note 115, at 36. "In surrendering the doctrine of successive prosecutions we would not be giving
up anything that has proved of value." Id.
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the federal interest in vindicating the civil rights of African-Americans and other
minorities became a priority for the Supreme Court. 149
SHOULD THERE HAVE BEEN A SECOND KING TRIAL?
The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Fatally Flawed
Under existing case law, the dual sovereignty doctrine is alive and well, and there
is no question that the federal government had the legal authority to prosecute the Los
Angeles police officers despite their acquittal in state court.'L Any argument that the
second prosecution was wrong, therefore, must challenge the correctness of the
doctrine. This Comment argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine is a flawed theory
that has outlived any legitimacy it once might have had.
The foundation of the doctrine is not nearly as impressive as Justice Frankfurter
insists.'51  United States v. Lanza,152 the case which articulated the doctrine, based
its holding on dicta in several nineteenth-century cases and ignored conflicting
dicta. 53 "Lanza was not simply an unexceptional case in which the Supreme Court
applied existing doctrine. Rather, the Court chose between competing authorities,"
wrote one critic. 154
'" See Murchison, supra note 21, at 433-34. A writer in 1992 who advocated a near-blanket rule against successive
prosecutions acknowledged the "troubling" repercussions if federal civil rights interests could not be vindicated.
Dawson, supra note 30, at 300. However, "[t]his rationale cannot cure the constitutional defect in the dual
sovereignty doctrine." Id. In addressing the King case, Dawson criticized the change of venue to a suburban
community "stocked with potential jurors ignorant of the racial hatred and brutal police practices that charge some
urban environments." Id. at 302. Changes of venue must fully implement "the principle of popular sovereignty by
ensuring that the power of a jury be wielded by people close to the facts and familiar with the context in which the
alleged crime occurred." Id. at 303. However, he maintained his position that, despite the "apparently lawless"
verdict, a federal prosecution following state acquittal is a violation of popular sovereignty. See id. at 302-03.
mn See supra text accompanying notes 51-65.
13 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 136. Frankfurter wrote of a "long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive
adjudication" compelling his conclusions. Id.
- 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
L" Cases relied on in Lanza included: Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); and Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847). These cases "were not concerned with
successive prosecutions by state and federal authorities. Rather, they concerned shared state and federal legislative
authority to criminalize certain conduct." Dawson, supra note 30, at 290 (emphasis in original).
The Lanza Court failed to acknowledge the conflicting dicta contained in: Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315
(1909); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820); and Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
In particular, Furlong and Nielsen gave the Court the conceptual basis it would have needed to disallow successive
prosecutions had it been so inclined. Murchison, supra note 21, at 385. "[N]o irrefutable logic dictated the Lanza
result .... Mhe pre-prohibition heritage contained contrary authority that could have been used to forbid successive
prosecutions .... mhose authorities could easily have been combined into a conceptual framework forbidding
successive prosecution." Id. at 398.
1 Murhinson, supra note 21, at 401.
Summuer, 1993]
21
Gorman: The Second Rodney King Trial
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994
The historical context of the mid-nineteenth century cases that were the basis for
the Lanza decision provides an explanation for the early development of the dual
sovereignty doctrine.155 At the same time, this historical context shows why the
doctrine is no longer valid.1 56 The cases were decided at a time when the most
prominent political issue was states' rights, with slavery often lurking beneath the
surface.157 In fact, Moore v. Illinois,5 1 which produced the definitive statement on
the dual sovereignty doctrine, 159 concerned the validity of state fugitive slave
legislation, an issue bathed in political ramifications."6 Moreover, states and the
federal government actually were operating in essentially different spheres of
criminal law during that time, a reality that has changed with the twentieth century
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction.16 1
Similarly, Lanza's historical context provides insight into why the Court chose
to follow the dual sovereignty dicta rather than opposing dicta.62 Congress had
recently passed the Volstead Act 63 as its method of enforcing the Eighteenth
' See Lewis, supra note 120, at 160.
'
5 6 See Braun, supra note 21, at 36.
'
5 Lewis, supra note 120, at 160. See also Holzhaus, supra note 129, at 1705. "The dual sovereignty doctrine was
introduced and developed during eras of federalist sentiment characterized by strident assertions of state sover-
eignty." Id.
' 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
1d at 19-20. See supra text accompanying note 82 for the statement.
' Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at 1542. "Given this setting, it is understandable that the Court relied on an
approach which emphasized that the federal and state governments were distinct and independent entities and gave
only slight consideration to the interest of the defendant." Id.
See also Lewis, supra note 120, at 160. "Any decision restricting the right of states to punish criminal offenses
by denying their concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government would probably have produced violent
opposition in the southern states." Id.
Moore v. Illinois, which provides the foundation of the dual sovereignty doctrine, upheld state legislation
punishing the harboring of fugitive slaves. Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How). at 21. The case was decided by a Court with
an apparent lack of sympathy to slaves. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. ( 19 How.) 393 (1857). It is ironic that
the while the dual sovereignty doctrine was rooted in a Court which might have been motivated by hostility to
African-Americans, the doctrine was preserved by a 1959 Court which might have feared that reversal would harm
the civil rights of African-Americans. See supra note 113.
"I See Braun, supra note 21, at 35. Today's relationship between state governments and the federal government often
does not reflect distinct sovereignties:
[A]s federal involvement in areas that had traditionally been perceived as state concerns has greatly
increased, the states' and nation's 'different spheres of jurisdiction' have grown increasingly
similar. Governments undertaking cooperative efforts to solve the common problems ofa common
constituency simply do not resemble the 'sovereigns' of independent polities described by the
proponents of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Id.
10 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
16 3Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933).
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Amendment authorizing prohibition.'6 The Court had at least three options in
Lanza," which involved a defendant who had been convicted in both state and
federal courts of violating prohibition laws.'" It could have ruled that successive
prosecutions were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. It could have issued a
narrow ruling that the unique "concurrent power" language of the Eighteenth
Amendment permitted dual prosecutions in prohibition cases.1 67 Or it could have
embraced the dual sovereignty doctrine broadly. It chose the last option.'
The Supreme Courtmade its ruling despite contrary common law tradition' 69 and
legislative history indicating Congress did not condone dual prosecutions. 7" The
ruling reflects the broad support courts accorded prohibition in the early years after
passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.' 71 The allegiance to dual sovereignty also
appears to be a product of a pre-New Deal perspective on the proper roles of the state
and federal governments in the American system, in which the federal government
was relatively small and overlapping spheres of jurisdiction were the exception
rather than the rule. 72
Assuming for a moment that the dual sovereignty doctrine was justified at an
earlier part of our history when there were clearer lines of jurisdiction between state
and federal governments, the doctrine fails to reflect the realities of today's
cooperative federalism. 73 As the Court conceded in Elkins 174 and Murphy,175 that
cooperation often no longer makes a distinction between federal and state criminal
investigations meaningful. 76 Despite the evolving nature of today's federalism,
I"The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified January 16, 1919, barred the manufacture, sale or transportation of
intoxicating liquors in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (repealed 1933). The amendment gave
Congress and the states "concurrent power" of enforcement. IL at § 2.
'"United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
'"See supra note 51.
Ile Eighteenth Amendment is the only provision in the Constitution explicitly giving states and the federal
government "concurrent" enforcement power. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIIM §2 (repealed 1933).
I" Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382. The Court rejected the middle argument, saying that the state government did not derive
its prosecutorial power from the Eighteenth Amendment's "concurrent power" language, but rather from the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal govemmenL 14.
'"See Grant, supra note 115, at 34-35.
" See supra note 54.
17' Murchison, supra note 21, at 398-401. The Supreme Court in the early years of prohibition favored those
responsible for enforcing prohibition but later developed new doctrines substantially more favorable to the rights
of individuals. Id. at 400-01. For a listing of some of the major prohibition decisions, see Murchison, Prohibition
and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 471,476-77,479-
80 (1982).
"
2 See Murchison, supra note 21, at 398.
' See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
'
74 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
'7' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
'
7 6 See generally Braun, supra note 21.
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however, the Court fails to acknowledge any weakness in the doctrine. 1 7 In retaining
the doctrine, the Court needlessly adheres to a flawed principle and ignores the
reality of today's federalism. 178 The doctrine is "a rule that has remained after the
reasons that originally prompted it have long since disappeared.' 179
The dual sovereignty doctrine fails to consider the individual's liberty interest. 8 '
In embracing the formalistic notion of separate sovereignties, the Court has ex-
pressly rejected suggestions to balance the government's legitimate interest in
prosecution with the individual's interest in avoiding successive trials.' 81 A failure
to at least consider the individual's interest in avoiding successive prosecutions
contradicts the spirit of the Fifth Amendment and centuries of common law.18 2
Repercussions for the Second Rodney King Trial
Proposing that the dual sovereignty doctrine should be abolished is not tanta-
mount to saying that the King defendants' second trial violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The constitutionality of the second trial depends on which policy on
successive prosecutions should be adopted in the absence of the dual sovereignty doctrine.'1
17'See Heathv. Alabama,474U.S. 82 (1985); United Statesv. Wheeler,435 U.S. 313 (1978). Thecases arediscussed
supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
"3 See Braun, supra note 21, at 10.
"
9 Murchison, supra note 21, at 425. Murchison also quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes.
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiarto the student of history, is this. The customs,
beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the
custom, belief, ornecessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule
has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some
grond ofpolicyis thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things;
andthenthenleadapts itself to thenew reasons whichhavebeenfoundforit, anderters [into] a new career.
Id. at 425 n.121 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881)).
In contrast to the wave of strong academic criticism of the dual sovereignty doctrine, one author defended it
as a necessary political tip of the cap to the states, who otherwise might fear being overrun by federal jurisdiction:
The feelings of state courts are as important as the reality of the situation. In such a circumstance
it is not surprising that concern with federalism would prevail over the right to plead double
jeopardy. Justice Frankfurter [in Bartkus] was faced with a conflict between the fifth and tenth
amendments and sensitively preferred the latter, an act of judicial statesmanship ....
SIGLER, supra note 26, at 59.
t See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
1m Heath, 474 U.S. at 92.
,82 See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
" See supra text accompanying notes 130-48 for a sampling of proposals to replace the dual sovereignty doctrine.
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Any legitimate policy must focus on two factors: the individual's constitution-
ally recognized interest in avoiding a second prosecution and the government's
legitimate interest in vindicating the interests of the people through the criminal
law. 8 Whether consideration of these factors would bar a successive prosecution
depends upon the weight of each factor in a given situation. In the King defendants'
case, careful consideration of the factors leads to the conclusion that the second trial
was unconstitutional."8 5
Any defendant who has been acquitted has a strong interest in avoiding a second
prosecution. It is worthwhile to revisit the Court's explanation of the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause:
The underlying idea [behind the Double Jeopardy Clause] ... is that the
state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty. 186
The federal government unquestionably used "all its resources and power" in the
King defendants' case. It assembled what the Justice Department called "one of the
most formidable prosecution teams ever assembled.' '8 7 Federal prosecutors learned
from the state's mistakes in the first trial and presented a more coherent and forceful
case. ' The Double Jeopardy Clause was meant to protect defendants from such
improved second efforts.8 9
'" See Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1971). Evaluating the propriety of a successive prosecution
requires "a balancing process, whereby we place the interests of the two sovereigns on one side of the judicial scale,
and on the other side we place the interest of the individual to be free from twice being prosecuted for the same
offense." Id. at 640-41.
"' Whether the trial was justified constitutionally on a theory that the state and federal charges constituted different
offenses is beyond the scope of this Comment. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The federal government's
stated justification for the successive prosecution was not a "different offense" theory but the dual sovereignty
doctrine. See supra note 11.
1" Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
187Jim Newton, 2 Officers Guilty, 2 Acquitted; Guarded Calm Follows Verdicts in King Case, LA. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1993, at A 1. Up to 17 FBI agents worked on the case at one time, an extraordinary commitment of staff to a single
investigation." Id. The trial team was headed by Barry F. Kowalski, arguably the nation's most experienced civil
rights prosecutor, who was sent from his Washington office to Los Angeles immediately after the riots. Key Figures
in the Trial, LA. TIMES, Apr. 18,1993, at A25.
"' Seth Mydans. Verdict in Los Angeles; Assessing the Outcome; Points of Evidence, Not Emotion, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18,1993, § 1 at page 33; Seth Mydans, 2 of4 Officers Found Guilty in Los Angeles Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1993,§ 1 at page 1.
' See, e.g., Paul R. Robinson, Comment, Grady v. Corbin: Solidifying the Analysis ofDouble Jeopardy, 17 CRIM.
& CIV. CONF. 395,407 (1991). "While the defendant is being both economically and psychologically worn down,
the government is improving and honing its trial strategy during each successive conviction attempt." l
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Perhaps more unsettling is the likelihood the defendants could not have received
a fair second trial in light of the public's reaction to the first acquittal.190 It is difficult
to believe ajury could have ignored the potential fallout of another acquittal. 19' Even
some who praised the guilty verdicts acknowledged that the jurors likely had public
peace as well as individual justice in mind. 92 In the King case, therefore, the
government's unsparing use of resources and the probability of a tainted second verdict
made the defendants' interest in avoiding a successive prosecution unusually strong."93
However, the federal government likewise had strong interests in pursuing the
second trial. First, the federal interest in protecting the civil rights of its citizens dates
back to legislation passed just after the Civil War.194 Vindicating that interest through
a successive prosecution is uncommon but by no means unprecedented."59 The
ISo Both sides took unusually meticulous precautions to obtain an impartial jury. Seth Mydans, A Jury's Trials: Will
Memories of Riots Influence a Verdict? N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at § 4, page 7. Approximately 6,000 potential
jurors were contacted, and those willing to serve were required to complete a 53-page questionnaire. id.
"' Bruce J. Terris, Corruption of Justice in L.A., LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at 22. "It is impossible to believe
that the jurors in the second trial did not consider the possibility that dozens of people would lose their lives and part
of Los Angeles would be destroyed if all the officers were found innocent." Id.
The likelihood that a jury has prejudged the case in light of the first trial is not unique to the King defendants'
case. In Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death in Alabama for
murdering his wife after having pleaded guilty to the same crime in Georgia in exchange for a life sentence- Id. at 84-
85. Of the 82 prospective jurors for the second trial, 75 stated that they were aware of the defendant's guilty plea. Id.
at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet most of them said they could put the guilty plea out of their minds as jurors in
the Alabama trial. Id. "With such a well-informed jury, the outcome of the trial was surely but a foregone conclusion."
id. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
L5 See Raspberry, supra note 8.
IS See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
'9 The roots of the statute under which the officers were charged, 18 U.S.C. § 242, can be traced to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951).
"The government has a special responsibility to vindicate federal interests protected by the civil rights statutes,"
said the legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, which favored the second trial.
Ricker, supra note 143, at 66.
The Southern California ACLU chapter broke with its national organization on the issue of successive
prosecutions. The ACLU's national board of directors, in response to the acquittals in the first trial, voted 32-31 in
July 1992 to reassess its opposition to successive prosecutions. Peter H. Stone & John Murawski, Board Vote Puts
ACLUPolicy in Jeopardy, LEGALTIMES, July 13,1992, at5. However, afterffurtherdebate the national organization
reaffirmed its view that successive prosecutions, even in the King defendants' case, violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Renee Tawa, ACLU Takes Position at Odds with L.A. Board, LA. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at A20.
,
9
" See Weinstein & Ostrow, supra note 5. The Justice Department had pursued six dual prosecutions on civil rights
charges in the two years preceding the indictments in the King defendants' case. See id.
For an example of a factual situation similar to the King defendants' case, in which police officers were
prosecuted by the Justice Department after acquittal on serious state charges, see United States v. Patterson 809 F.2d
244 (5th Cir. 1987). But such cases are rare. Warren, supra note 119. Between 1988 and 1992, there were only five
civil rights cases involving police officers prosecuted following state acquittals. !d. Three were in the South and two
were in Puerto Rico. Id.
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federal interest in vindicating civil lights is so strong that many who criticize the dual
sovereignty doctrine nevertheless recommend allowing successive prosecutions in
civil rights cases. 196
Second, the federal government actually began its investigation in the King case
prior to the first trial but deferred action while the state completed its criminal case. 197
It could have pre-empted the state prosecution by obtaining an early federal trial
date,19 but it opted to see whether the state would vindicate the federal interest. 99
The Justice Department would argue that its pragmatic decision not to "race the state
to the courthouse" should not prevent it from vindicating its interest when the state
failed to do so.20
See e.g., Dawson, supra note 30, at 300-01; Holzhaus, supra note 129, at 1711; Lee, supra note 19, at 54.
However, a factor normally justifying a successive prosecution in civil rights cases is not present in the King
defendants' case. Support for a federal civil rights trial often lies in the suspicion that state officials let offenders off
the hook either by a sham prosecution or by failure to devote adequate resources to trials against those who are
accused of harming minorities. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 30, at 300. No one has accused the state prosecutors
in the King defendants' case of giving anything less than their best, albeit unsuccessful, effort. See Weinstein &
Ostrow, supra note 5.
The Southern California ACLU branch argues that a fundamental judicial error justified a second trial. See
Ricker, supra note 143, at 66-67. The decision to change venue to a suburban area which failed to reflect the racial
composition of the people of Los Angeles "undermined the fairness of the first prosecution," according to the ACLU
of Southern California. See id. at 66. The national ACLU, in contrast to its southern California branch, opposes all
successive prosecutions, including the second King triaL See supra note 194.
Another commentator agreed with the southern California ACLU that the venue change to a suburban area was
erroneous but did not support a successive prosecution. See Dawson, supra note 30, at 302-03.
I" Weinstein & Ostrow, supra note 5.
'98 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1988). California law precludes the state from prosecuting if another
jurisdiction already has prosecuted for the same "act oromission."Id. The single charge unresolved at the first trial-
one count of police brutality against Officer Laurence M. Powell which resulted in a hung jury-was dismissed
because of the federal trial. Key Figures in the Trial, supra note 187.
'9 See Weinstein & Ostrow, supra note 5. Several factors are considered in determining whether the federal interest
has been vindicated, according to a former Justice Department civil rights chief. See id. Those factors include
whether there has been a bona fide prosecution by local officials, whether the outcome of a case is clearly at odds
with the evidence, and the nature of the offense. Id. While there clearly was a bona fide prosecution in the state case,
the other two criteria apparently weighed in favor of a second trial. See id.
"nThe Justice Department followed its Petite Policy, see supra note 65, and proceeded only upon the authorization
of the appropriate assistant Attorney General. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Race to Try Clark Clifford, TEX. LAW.,
Aug. 17, 1992, at 8.
The Clark Clifford case provides an illustration of an unsightly "race to the courthouse." See id. Both the state
of New York and the federal government indicted Clifford and Robert Altman, executives in the collapsed Bank of
Credit & Commerce International, for various fraud, bribery and conspiracy charges. See id. New York has a statute,
however, which generally bars a state trial if a defendant has been prosecuted for the same act by the federal
government. N.Y. CRnM PROC. LAW § 40.20(2) (McKinney 1992). Believing they stood a better chance on the less
specific federal charges, Clifford's attorneys sought an early trial date in federal court. Coffee, supra. New York
prosecutors then obtained an even earlier state trial date. Id. The 86-year-old Clifford has yet to stand trial because
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Finally, the federal government has an interest in preserving the credibility of
its justice system. Government officials did not expressly acknowledge such an
interest in the King case, but it is implicit in their reactions in the aftermath of the
two trials.201 The initial federal response to the rioting was to assure the public that
the defendants were not offthe hook3 2 The commitment of extraordinary amounts
of federal resources2 3 and the Administration's strong praise of the guilty verdicts
of the second trial' indicate that this was more than a case about Rodney King's civil
rights; it also was the government's attempt to show the public that the system can
work." 5
After analyzing the interests of the government and the defendants, it is clear that
both sides have compelling arguments. The police officers' argument is rooted in
the Double Jeopardy Clause and centuries of common law prohibiting a second trial
after acquittal in a court with jurisdiction.2 6 The government's argument is based
of serious health problems, but Altman was acquitted of all state charges in a New York trial. Wade Lambert &
Jonathan M. Moses, Collapse ofthe CaseAgainstAltmanMoves BCCIFcs Overseas,WALLST. J., Aug. 16,1993,
at A 1. In light of Altman's acquittal in state court, the Justice Department is not likely to resume its case against either
Clifford or Altman. Sharon Walsh, The Case That Bit Back, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1993, at Cl.
"Over the long run, if prosecutors cannot cooperate they will compete, and races to the cotrthouse become
likely. Indeed, the case's practical message to state prosecutors may be not to share witnesses and evidence with
federal authorities--until they are on the eve of a state trial." Coffee, supra.
The "race to the courthouse" could be avoided, however, if Congress would pass legislation allowing the federal
government to pre-empt state prosecutions under certain circumstances. See Double Prosecution, supra note 54, at
1555; Camina, supra note 65, at 361-62. But see Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Bartkus "It would be in
derogation of our federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of [federal
prosecution]." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
201 See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
In an apparent attempt to restore calm to Los Angeles, the United States Attorney General announced less than
24 hours after the acquittals, "It's important for people to remember that the verdicts on state charges are not the end
of the process. The Department of Justice is responsible for enforcing the civil rights laws of the United States and
it will do so vigorously." Weinstein & Ostrow, supra note 5.
Congress expressed outrage to the verdict and called for quick federal action. See Congress Reacts to King
Verdict, N.P.R. Morning Edition, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Senator Patrick
Leahy called the verdict "outrageous" and "obscene," while Senator Bill Bradley called for federal charges to be
filed: "If a crime is done and the system doesn't work, that's what the civil rights laws are all about." Id.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
2
" "Justice was done," said Attorney GeneralJanet Reno in response to the guilty verdicts. Sam Fulwood II, Clinton
Praises Judgment of Jury, Urges Healing, Harmony Across U.S., L.A. TtMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at A21. Added
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, who was the Clinton Administration's point person in Los Angeles in the wake
of the riots, "This trial should be viewed as a great step in a long march to justice." Id.
President Clinton said the guilty verdicts served as "a reminder that our courts are the proper forum for the
resolution of even our deepest legal disputes." ld.
2w See generally Grant, supra note 115 (study of common law shows virtually no support for successive
prosecutions).
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in its long-recognized responsibility to vindicate the civil rights of its citizens 207 and in
its desire to enhance social stability by restoring confidence in the justice system.2o
As unsettling as it is to reach a conclusion which would allow the guilty police
officers to go unpunished, certain facts cannot be ignored. California's prosecution
in the first trial, despite its failure, was a bona fide effort.2 The same conduct of the
police officers was the basis of both trials.210 The aggressive pursuit of the second
trial stemmed from public outrage and political pressure.2 1' And, this Comment
argues, a federal interest in social stability does not justify successive prosecutions in
a nation with a Double Jeopardy Clause and a long tradition of respect for individual
rights and liberties.212 This is especially true because a successive prosecution in the
interest of social stability is likely to take place in a highly charged atmosphere in
which jurors would be hard-pressed to ignore the social effect of their verdict.21 3
Such a conclusion does not mean that all successive prosecutions, even in the
federal civil rights context, are unwarranted. When a federal civil rights interest is
not vindicated by a state trial, a second trial should be permitted when there is
evidence that the state did not put forth a bona fide effort214 or when the federal charge
is based on conduct not addressed in a state proceeding.15 Nor does such a rule
preclude the federal government from enforcing its civil rights statutes. First, it may
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 196.
210Terris, supra note 191. "While cleverlawyers can show us that the first and second trials were for different crimes,
no one really believes this. Common sense tells us that the defendants were tried twice for the same crime; use of
excessive force." Id.
An analysis of whetherthe federal and state charges could be considered different "offenses," thereby rendering
the Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable, is beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses on the dual
sovereignty doctrine. See supra note 185. However, proponents of a successive prosecution in the King case did not
rely on a theory that the second trial was based on a different offense. See id.2 I See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; see also supra note 202 (congressional pressure).
2n U.S. CONST. amend. V; See Terris, supra note 191. "Mhe American justice system operates on the principles
... that prosecutors get only one chance to persuade a jury to convict. This is a hard rule. It means that defendants
about whose guilt we are virtually certain sometimes go free.. . ." i
2" See Terris. supra note 191. "It is impossible to believe that the jurors in the second trial did not consider the
possibility that dozens of people would lose their lives and part of Los Angeles would be destroyed if all the officers
were found innocent." Id. See also Raspberry, supra note 8. "Surely [the jurors] must have given some thought to
the fact that last year's acquittal.. had triggered deadly rioting." Id.
21
, See supra note 199. See also Steven Chapman, In the King Case, One Injustice May Lead to Another, CHI. TRIB.,
May 14, 1992, at 27. "When the state courts habitually engage in outrageous abuses of their authority, a exception
to the double-jeopardy ban is justified. But that isn't what produced [the King defendants'] verdict." Id.
215 In such a scenario, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not be implicated because the defendant would not be
prosecuted twice for the "same offense." See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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do so when states fail to prosecute. Second, the federal government can exercise its
supremacy 216 by enacting legislation authorizing the Justice Department to pre-empt
state action when it feels a compelling need to initiate a civil rights prosecution.217
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court embraced the dual sovereignty doctrine in 1922, it
relied on dicta from pre-Civil War cases that may have been tainted by the political
turmoil of that era.218 Ignoring centuries of contrary common law,21 9 the Court chose
a brand of federalism which dodged the Double Jeopardy Clause by allowing a single
wrongful act to be treated as two offenses. 0 Such a foundation made the doctrine
suspect from the time it was announced.
However, the doctrine could be defended in an age when the state and federal
governments operated in essentially different spheres and therefore arguably re-
sembled two different sovereignties. 22' Today is not such an age, particularly in the
field of criminal law, where state and federal officials often cooperate and statutes
overlap.? 2 These developments serve the public interest.2 But they also refute any
argument that, in the words of Chief Justice Taft, "we have here two sovereignties.'"
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the reality of cooperative federalism,
but has failed to consider its effect on the dual sovereignty doctrine. It has relied
instead on a formalistic mantra that each level of government must be allowed to
vindicate its interests fully.226 Such logic ignores the purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and it does so unnecessarily: the legitimate interests of the states and the
federal government could be preserved by adopting a new theory which would
balance the interests of the government and the individual.'
216 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 17 See Double Prosectaion, supra note 54, at 1555; Camina, supra note 65, at 361-62.
218 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); see supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
" See text accompanying supra note 82.
22See Braun, supra note 21, at 10.
2 See id at 5.
w Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211(1960).
24 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
22
' See supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
22 6 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985); Bartkus v. Illinois, 357 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
227 See supra text accompanying notes 130-48 for a sampling of proposed altematives to the dual sovereignty
doctrine.
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In the Rodney King case, the defendants' interest in avoiding a second prosecu-
tion was unusually strong because of the extraordinary effort of the federal govern-
ment in the second trial and the likelihood that conviction would be obtained in part
because of outside pressures on the jury.2 The federal government had an interest
in vindicating King's civil rights.22 9 It also had an interest in maintaining social
stability by restoring people's faith in the justice system.' However, given the
Double Jeopardy Clause and our nation's respect for individual liberties, an interest
in social stability does not justify a successive prosecution following a bona fide
trial."1  The unusually strong liberty interest of the King defendants, therefore,
outweighs the government's legitimate interests and should have precluded the
second King trial.' 2
ROBERT C. GORMAN
See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
23A Galluppoll of 401 federal and state judges nationwide in June 1993 indicated that 27 percentbelieved the second
King trial constituted double jeopardy. Gary A. Hengstler, How Judges View Retrial ofLA. Cops, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1993, at 71. The poll's margin of error was plus or minus 4.9 percent. L
District Judge John Davies, who presided over the federal trial, sentenced the guilty officers to only 30 months
in prison, considerably less than the six to seven years recommended in federal sentencing guidelines. Jim Newton,
Koon, Powell get 2 1/2 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993. at A 1. Among the reasons he cited for the lighter
sentences was the fact the defendants endured two trials. Id. "The second prosecution has the specter of unfairness,"
Judge Davies said. Id. The Justice Department disagreed with Judge Davies' criticism of the dual prosecutions and
announced it would appeal the sentence. Henry Weinstein, Justice Dept. to Appeal Powell, Koon Sentences, LA.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at Al.
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